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Storm Warnings in the Straits:
Russian-Ottoman Trade Issues
Theophilus C. Prousis
University of North Florida
Russian envoys in the Ottoman capital routinely raised storm warnings over
commerce and other contentious points in Russian-Ottoman relations. Trade
formed part of the “precarious balance” between conflict and negotiation, as the
two adjacent empires competed for lands, peoples and resources along porous
frontiers and engaged in risky but profitable commercial exchange.1 Archival
documents from the Russian embassy in Constantinople provide telling detail and
firsthand commentary on trade issues, contested borders and related concerns in
Russian-Ottoman affairs of the early 19th century. These sources not only indicate
the variety of interests that shaped Russian policy in the eastern Mediterranean but
highlight some of the underlying tensions that generated friction in the RussianOttoman relationship. Moreover, these records attest to Russia’s maritime
presence in the Ottoman Levant and to the important but largely neglected facet of
trade in the European rivalries that fueled the Eastern Question.
Commerce became a crucial component of Russian involvement in the
Eastern Question after the landmark Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774), when
Russia received the right of merchant shipping in the Black Sea and in other areas
of the Ottoman Empire, along with the right to establish consulates anywhere in
the Ottoman realm. Subsequent accords with the Sublime Porte, such as the Treaty
of Commerce (1783), the Treaty of Jassy (1792) and the Treaty of Bucharest
(1812), reaffirmed these trade and consular concessions. The opening of the Black
Sea to merchant navigation stimulated the economic growth of the Russian South,
the export of grains and other commodities via seaports like Odessa and the
development of a Russian merchant marine in the Euxine, the Levant and the
wider Mediterranean.2 Economic profit thus joined strategic, military, diplomatic
and religious considerations in defining Russian interests in the Near East and in
shaping tsarist policy toward the Ottoman Empire.3
Primary sources, both published and unpublished, offer the best way to
examine Russia's trade activity in Ottoman waters from the Black Sea to the
Levant. Archival and manuscript holdings, in particular Moscow's Archive of
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Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI), contain an extensive array of
resources on Russia's contacts and connections with the Ottoman Empire,
including trade.4 Russian scholars have made excellent use of AVPRI in their
studies on tsarist policies and interests in the Balkans, Greece and the wider
Ottoman world and one hopes that they, along with scholars from Greece, Turkey,
Britain and North America, will continue to mine these sources for scholarly work
on particular topics. For instance, a recent publication of AVPRI materials on
Russia's activities in Ottoman Palestine in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
demonstrates the value of identifying documents on a specific theme or issue and
making them readily available for scholarly research.5
A broad selection of AVPRI records can be found in the Foreign Policy of
Russia (VPR), a treasure trove of sixteen massive tomes covering the first three
decades of the 19th century.6 To be sure, Russian and Western historians of tsarist
policy in the Near East and the Balkans have tapped some of the relevant sources
in this rich compendium, but overall VPR remains a neglected resource and my
research exemplifies the discovery or rediscovery of rare items in this published
collection. The careful scholar interested in Russian commerce in the Black Sea
and the Levant can glean countless details from VPR's position papers,
memoranda, diplomatic correspondence and consular reports, materials that
warrant scrutiny for the study of Russian, Ottoman, Mediterranean and Balkan
history. The VPR documents introduced here deserve a wider audience not just
because they provide a Russian perspective on trade disputes in the Ottoman
Levant but because they remind scholars and students alike of the wealth of
information on merchant shipping, border issues and related topics in the multivolume VPR.
Russia's Black Sea and Mediterranean merchant marine relied on captains
and sailors of Greek and Italian descent who operated Russian-flagged vessels and
who often worked for merchants and ship-owners, also of Greek and Italian
origins, residing in Odessa, Kherson, Taganrog, Nikolaev and other Black Sea
ports. Consuls of Greek, Italian, French and Balkan descent staffed most of
Russia's consular offices in the Ottoman Empire. Their knowledge of Italian,
French and Greek, the main languages of exchange in the Levant, and their
familiarity with Ottoman society and institutions made these consular appointees
potentially useful as intermediaries with Ottoman officials and as conduits of trade
and other information for the tsarist embassy in Constantinople and the Foreign
Ministry in St. Petersburg.7
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Yet Russian commercial and consular affairs in the Levant faced perils,
such as piracy in Ottoman waters, Russo-Turkish wars and Ottoman violations of
treaty accords. Trade problems also stemmed from the notorious capitulations ―
privileges and concessions awarded to subjects of Russia and other European
states which had treaty contracts with the Sublime Porte. Russian subjects who
traveled, traded and resided in the Ottoman Empire enjoyed various capitulations:
unrestricted trade and navigation, reduced customs duties, immunity from
Ottoman laws, exemption from Ottoman taxes, consular protection and guarantees
of personal security. While these concessions were not always observed by
sultans, nor automatically binding on regional and port authorities, they were
often manipulated by European states to advance strategic and commercial
interests.8
Russia's envoys and consuls, like their European counterparts, distributed
berats (patents of protection) to Ottoman subjects, who henceforth had
capitulatory protection in return for performing useful services in trade, shipping
and diplomacy. Protégés or beratlis (holders or owners of berats), drawn mainly
from the reaya, the sultan's Christian subjects, enjoyed capitulatory benefits as
interpreters, sailors and ship captains for tsarist Russia and proved crucial in the
transactions of Russian traders in the Ottoman Empire.9 Moreover, at least some
of these reaya mariners and navigators in Russian service benefited from the
traffic in counterfeit ship titles. This fraudulent practice enabled Ottoman sailors
and captains to hoist the Russian flag on vessels that, although registered as
Russian property, were in fact owned and operated by Ottoman subjects, many of
them Greeks from the seafaring islands of Chios, Hydra, Psara and Spetsae.10
They enjoyed protégé status, while their employers in Black Sea ports had access
to additional ships for transporting goods to and from Smyrna, Constantinople,
Odessa and other trade centers.
Ottoman officials sought to curtail abuses of the capitulatory system by
limiting the Russian flag to strictly Russian ships, namely, those carriers owned
and operated by bona fide Russian subjects, and by reducing the number of reaya
in Russian service. Ottoman authorities threatened to seize cargoes from vessels
suspected of flying the Russian flag under false pretense and to apprehend reaya
sailors and captains posing as Russian subjects.11 Ottoman inspections of crews
and occasional seizures of cargoes, along with the imposition of extra customs
dues, interfered with Russia's right of unimpeded merchant navigation. The Porte
also breached treaty agreements by evading prompt restitution to shippers and
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traders whose vessels suffered damages or fell prey to piracy in Ottoman waters.
Furthermore, the Porte did not always honor treaty rights that allowed Russia to
set up consulates anywhere in the Ottoman Empire deemed necessary for trade.
Russia's envoys and staff posted to the diplomatic mission in Constantinople
complained about these unresolved trade and consular issues in dispatches to the
St. Petersburg Foreign Ministry and in memoranda to the Porte.12
After the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) tsarist policy in the Near East
sought to maintain cordial ties with the Porte and to uphold existing treaties.
Directives from the Foreign Ministry instructed Russia's new envoy in
Constantinople, Grigorii A. Stroganov, to act prudently in urging the Porte's
compliance with treaty provisos and in resolving trade and other disagreements.13
Stroganov, however, faced an arduous task due to ongoing abuses of the
capitulatory system and the Porte's ensuing actions to restrict Russian shipping.
While he performed his duties with restraint, endeavoring to abide by Foreign
Ministry guidelines, he ardently defended Russia's treaty rights regarding
commerce and consulates during his ambassadorship from 1816 to 1821.
In a lengthy memorandum to the Ottoman government in December 1816,
Stroganov set forth a series of grievances that undermined the spirit of peace,
cooperation and reciprocity between Russia and Turkey.14 He described numerous
violations of Russian-Ottoman treaty articles by Ottoman officials, assigning
ultimate responsibility for these transgressions to the Porte. In four appendices to
this document, the envoy detailed the extent of damages to Russian merchant
shipping, enumerating ship and cargo seizures by Ottoman officials, excessive
customs charges and other losses in the Dardanelles, the Danube, the Aegean and
the eastern Mediterranean.15 He cited the names of confiscated and detained
vessels; the names of ship captains; the amounts of monetary damages; the dates
of previous (and unfulfilled) requests for Ottoman restitution; and the specific
places where piracy and other abuses took place ― the Straits, Istanbul, Sinop,
Smyrna, Aleppo, the Morea, Crete, Samos, Tenedos, Chios and Cyprus.
These details help us understand the perils as well as the personnel of
Russian trade networks in the Levant. The Greek, Italian and Russian names of
Russian-flagged vessels and of ship captains, sailors and traders in Russia's fluid
merchant marine underscore the difficulty of identifying bona fide Russian
subjects and protégés who enjoyed capitulatory protection. The trade of Russia
and other European states in the Ottoman East relied on a variegated stock of
reaya, an amorphous lot whose members may or may not have been protégés of
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European powers. Greeks, Italians, Levantines, Turks and others sold their skills
as agents, brokers, shippers, sailors and interpreters. They negotiated contested
frontiers and diversified the social and ethnic composition of European
commercial intermediaries in the Ottoman world.
An anonymous report of December 1816, written most likely by an official
in the Russian embassy, perhaps by envoy Stroganov himself since it echoes some
of the problems he discussed in the above-cited memorandum, makes the case for
the establishment of a Russian consulate-general in the Ottoman capital, an office
that would devote itself solely to commercial transactions.16 Without consular
protection, the memorandum claimed, traders and sailors “depend utterly and
entirely on the arbitrariness of local authorities and port officials and as a result
incur huge losses .... Nowhere is the protection of a consul so necessary as in
Turkey, for nowhere [else] do minor governmental officials utilize their full
authority and wield it so despotically.” Many European states, both large and
small, maintained consuls in the principal ports of the Ottoman Empire and
“without [consuls], by general acknowledgement, it would be absolutely
impossible for any country to conduct trade.”
In Europe's major maritime centers — St. Petersburg, London, Stockholm,
Lisbon, Naples, Genoa and Venice — foreign states had established not just
embassies for diplomatic relations with host countries but in most cases consular
offices that dealt exclusively with commerce. In Constantinople, where diplomatic
envoys guaranteed the personal security and the property of their countries'
merchants and sailors, consulates proved essential for expediting the mundane
details associated with trade, such as the payment of customs dues, the
unrestricted buying and selling of goods, the departure of vessels without delays
and rulings on trade disputes. While other European states traded directly with
ports situated throughout the Levant, Russian commerce in the region required
passage through the Straits; indeed, the Ottoman capital, strategically perched on
this vital commercial highway, remained “the key to southern Russia's maritime
trade not only with the ports of the Ottoman Empire but with the entire
Mediterranean.” The founding of a Russian consulate-general in Istanbul would
relieve the envoy of the onerous task of overseeing all the routine particulars
associated with commerce, “the nature of which can sometimes lower” his dignity
and rank.
More crucially, a consulate would advance Russia's trade interests,
especially if the new post were entrusted to someone “well versed in commercial
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affairs who knows Turkey well and who has command of Turkish, Greek, and
even French and Italian, in addition to Russian.” While an envoy usually
conducted diplomatic negotiations with the help of a dragoman or interpreter,
commercial transactions required immediate action and could not afford delays
necessitated by a consul who, “knowing only his native language has to rely
entirely on interpreters. Moreover, it is generally known that in important trade
affairs the Turks regard a consul with great respect,” considering him an official
of almost equal rank as an ambassador, whereas they viewed a dragoman as a
mere translator. Thus, a consul with requisite language skills would be able to
expedite commercial affairs in a timely, efficient manner.
Stroganov's blunt note to the Porte in December 1818 condemned “the
deplorable affair” of a Russian flag “torn to pieces in the [Ottoman] capital
itself.”17 This insult, “having occurred in broad daylight, in the presence of
hundreds of ships of various countries,” demanded an official and public apology
from the Porte, all the more so since the actual culprits unjustly accused innocent
Russian sailors. Based on the Russian embassy's own inquiry into the matter,
Stroganov reported what happened in the port of Constantinople.
“Turkish boatmen, incited to attack by the shouts of one of their friends,
climbed aboard the Russian ship ‘Leonidas,’ whose entire crew, hoisting the
[Russian] flag as a symbol of sacred inviolability, sought shelter on nearby
vessels.” The assailants “trampled upon the flag” and “tore it to pieces with their
boat hooks.” In retaliation, crews from several nearby ships threw logs at the
Turkish sailors, “inflicting injuries to three or four of them.” Only with the arrival
of the local police guard did the crowd disperse, “taking with them the shreds of
[our] flag. A man who seized the largest piece is well known; he is the same
boatman who was the chief instigator of the outrage that was perpetrated.” The
facts of the case, including eyewitness testimony from ship captains, prompted
Stroganov's appeal to the Porte to acquit the sailors from the “Leonidas,” who
were in no way responsible for an incident provoked by Ottoman subjects. The
envoy protested the Porte's decision to try the Russian seamen in an Ottoman
court, contending that “if they were actually guilty, they would have already been
judged and punished in accordance with the treaties,” a reference to the swift and
strict justice rendered by the Russian embassy to Russian subjects accused of
actions that violated Russian-Ottoman agreements.
Although Stroganov argued that the feud involving the sailors should be
resolved according to treaty provisions, the insult to Russia's flag required a
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different Ottoman reply. “Quite otherwise is the matter of the outrage committed
against the Russian flag in the very port of Constantinople in the presence of the
government. What then must occur in distant provinces!” It was precisely this
affront to Russia's national honor in the heart of Constantinople that compelled the
envoy to request amends from the Porte. “The right of hospitality, due respect for
the flag of a friendly neighboring government, the sanctity of treaties — all were
violated by the unbridled audacity of the Turkish boatmen, and this invariably
makes their outrage inexcusable and unprecedented.” On behalf of the tsarist
government, Stroganov demanded punishment of the guilty party and expressed
hope “that the consequences of such a serious incident will not damage the ties of
sincere friendship between both [our] governments.”
Returning to the episode of the “Leonidas” in a lengthy diplomatic note
submitted to the Porte in January 1819, the ambassador vented his dismay not just
at “the insult inflicted on the Russian flag in broad daylight in the very port” of
Constantinople but at the Ottoman regime's denial of the facts of the case as
presented by the Russian embassy.18 If abuses of power “took place and went
completely unpunished” in the capital itself, “what can one think about the
excesses committed in other parts of Turkey!” By “other parts of Turkey,”
Stroganov alluded to another contested issue in Russian-Turkish relations:
Russian-Ottoman frontiers near the Kuban, Abkhazia and Kars fell prey to attacks
by Circassians and other bandits who captured Russian subjects, livestock and
property and who sold Russian captives into slavery. Indeed, the envoy continued,
nothing is sacred for Asiatic tribes which have the audacity to abduct
our subjects directly from their peaceful dwellings and to reduce them
to a mere commodity for trading, conducted under the open protection
of pashas. Many Russians languish in slavery in Anatolia. Based on
the latest dispatches of the commander-in-chief in Georgia, even a
Cossack sentry was subjected to the threat of being driven into
slavery. Our trade and our navigation not only fail to receive
assistance, which runs counter to existing treaties, but too often are
exposed to constraints, and our complaints regarding this [matter]
have not been satisfied ....19
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Did such a state of affairs, Stroganov concluded, really provide a valid basis for the
peace and neighborliness that supposedly bound the Russian and Ottoman
governments?
In a dispatch of January 1819 to Foreign Minister Nessel'rode, Stroganov
conveyed concern over intensifying Ottoman complaints about Ottoman Christian
subjects, or reaya, who illegally used the Russian flag on their merchant vessels.20
“The Porte, becoming bolder every day, raised this question in a resolute manner
and in such a defiant tone that it is impossible not to expect serious
consequences.” The reis efendi, or Ottoman foreign secretary, wanted to punish a
Russian captain accused of smuggling during his purchase of barley, insisting that
the culprit fell to Ottoman jurisdiction as an Ottoman subject. Stroganov pledged
to return the barley and to punish the guilty party, provided the inquiry he ordered
established that a misdemeanor had been committed. The envoy stretched the facts
to accommodate his claims, stating that “all ships which fly the flag of the Russian
Empire belong without question to Russian merchants and if a captain in their
service [belongs to the] reaya or is a foreigner, then this circumstance in no way
alters ... the exclusive jurisdiction of the Russian [diplomatic] mission over
everything that pertains to these ships.”
Two days after Stroganov discussed the smuggling incident with the
Ottoman foreign secretary, the latter brought up the matter in a conference with
the first dragoman, or interpreter, of the Russian embassy. According to
dragoman Franchini, after first inquiring whether or not the accused captain had
been punished, the reis efendi “then sharply criticized Russia's protection of the
Greeks.”
In accordance with [Russian-Ottoman] treaties ... Turkish officials
cannot subject to inspection the goods on board Russian ships; they
must be satisfied with the declarations presented to them. It is another
matter regarding the sailors; all of those who turn out to be reaya must
be made to disembark on shore. All the inhabitants of the Archipelago
have become Russians, [and] we have no more reaya left.
Persons who are reaya travel to Russia, return with passports after
several months, and from then on are considered subjects of the
Imperial [Russian] court. We do not understand this [practice]. The
envoy told me that there are ships belonging to Russia and
commanded by reaya or persons of foreign nationality. If other
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governments permit this [practice], then the Porte in no way can agree
with it. Our reaya have learned to complete fictitious transactions, but
we will not tolerate this. Convey to the envoy that all this must stop;
otherwise [our] government will be forced to take appropriate
measures.21
Stroganov rejected the Ottoman reproach that Russian officials participated
in or facilitated fraudulent arrangements allowing reaya to sail under the
protection of the Russian flag. The Russian mission “does not engage and will
never engage in complicity. If Greeks, who try with all their means to make use of
Russian protection, succeed in reaching agreements with individual traders, then
they always apply to foreign offices to register these transactions, and we accept
them only after the presentation of indisputable documents, drawn up according to
all the regulations.” Ottoman complaints, the envoy argued, sought “to weaken the
trust in us on the part of the Greeks” and to counter Russia's many claims by
simply demonstrating that “we have violated one of the agreed upon treaty
obligations ....” He voiced alarm that Ottoman objections might result in a
decision “to subject [even] our smallest boats to inspection and to disembark all
[captains and crew] who appear to be reaya, [actions] which would strike a very
substantial blow to our honor as well as to our influence and our trade.” Stroganov
predictably insisted that Russia's mission had conducted itself in strict accordance
with treaty agreements and that Ottoman officials would never succeed in proving
their charges about crooked transactions; “but they have the absolute right to
inspect those vessels which they threaten, always convinced they will find reaya
on board our ships.”
Protests about reaya who illegally flew the Russian flag invariably raised
wider concerns about tsarist strategy in the Near East, including Russia's rivalry
with Britain. The envoy correctly asserted that Russia's “magnanimous protection”
of the Greeks “must undoubtedly be subordinate to the higher interests” of the
Russian state. “Yet the Greeks have already become accustomed to this protection,
regarding it as their only consolation and only hope. England looks upon these
feelings with the utmost envy; her constant insinuations undoubtedly incite the
discontent of the Turks all the more in this matter.”22 England's “perfidious policy
will not fail to exploit the first favorable circumstance” in order to supplant
Russian influence in the Archipelago.
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British-induced Ottoman restrictions against Russian shipping posed a
direct threat to Russia's interests in the Mediterranean. “If severe regulations were
to deprive reaya of all means and pretexts to use our privileges,” not only would
trade suffer but Russia's merchant fleet would be hurt as well. Black Sea ports
such as Odessa may have been “flourishing” according to Stroganov, but he fully
acknowledged the shortage of Russian sailors and captains in the country's
expanding Black Sea merchant marine; indeed, only a few of these vessels were
actually “equipped and staffed with our subjects.” Stroganov thus admitted that
most of the ship captains and sailors who served on Russian-flagged vessels
comprised either seafaring reaya or other foreign nationals with maritime
experience. “Our shortage of sailors is so great that in 1812-13 we had to rescind
for a short time the regulation that two thirds of the crew on each ship under our
flag must consist of Russians.”23 Even when Russia strictly observed this
regulation, Ottoman inspections of ships passing through the Straits caused delays
and problems. If Ottoman investigations found only ten or fewer reaya on board
ship, these small numbers sufficed for Ottoman authorities “to display their
unfriendliness, to kick up a storm, and to demand debarkations.” Such were the
controls the Porte now endeavored to impose on Russian trade.
In a note of January 1819, Stroganov reminded the Porte of its own repeated
declarations that treaties represented inviolable contracts.24 The envoy cited the
capitulations as necessary for the protection of Russian and other foreign nationals
in the Ottoman realm, a land he described as vastly different from European
Christian countries in matters of religion, law and custom. “Treaties with Turkey
contain special privileges and rights which must be observed, even if they are
onerous for one of the sides ....” A treaty symbolized a bond “as sacred as a
monarch's word,” and European envoys in Constantinople had the duty to
safeguard capitulations, “treaty privileges that protected” the subjects of European
states who resided or traded in the Ottoman Empire. Underscoring the need to
maintain cordial ties between Russia and Turkey, Stroganov requested an end to
abuses which infringed upon both the personal security of Russian subjects and
the duties of the Russian mission on behalf of those subjects.
Consular postings proved to be another contentious issue in RussianOttoman relations. Stroganov's note of October 1819 objected to the Porte's
repeated delays in granting the necessary documents (berats and firmans) for
certifying Russian consular appointments in Moldavia, Wallachia and Athens.25
Both the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji and the Treaty of Commerce had provisions
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giving Russia the indisputable right “to appoint, according to its own discretion,
consuls anywhere in the Ottoman Empire ...; to determine their authority and
appropriate range of duties; [and] to prescribe the extent of [their] responsibility.”
This right, the envoy stated, “stems from the very treaties which ... the reigning
sultan of today has promised to observe.”26 Stroganov called on the Porte to issue
the requisite certificates as soon as possible.
The Eastern crisis of the 1820s exacerbated Russian-Ottoman discord over
commerce and consulates. The outbreak of the Greek revolt, naval clashes
between Ottoman and Greek forces and Russia's claim to protect Orthodox
Christians disrupted trade traffic and threatened the economic well-being of
Odessa and other Black Sea ports. The Ottoman government suspected that
Russian-flagged vessels transported arms and provisions to Greek rebels or were
owned and operated by insurgent shippers from Hydra, Psara and Spetsae.27
Ottoman confiscations of grain exports from Russian ships, combined with
dwindling numbers of Ottoman vessels entering Black Sea markets, eroded the
profits of more than a few Odessa merchants and ship-owners. Indeed, one of
these businessmen filed a formal complaint with Foreign Minister Nessel'role in
1823, declaring that two of his ships failed to secure the requisite Ottoman
permission to sail the Straits.28 Other documents substantiate the dangers and risks
of trade during the Eastern crisis and the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29.29
Russian archival records, published and unpublished, remain invaluable for
researching Russian trade in the Straits and across other contested frontiers in the
Ottoman Empire. A more complete understanding of this topic depends on the
collaborative efforts of multiple scholars examining multiple sources in French,
British, Greek, Italian and Turkish archives and libraries. Ottoman documents in
particular offer indispensable leads for the study of commerce in the Levant, and it
is hoped that more of these records will become accessible to a wider public and
that Turkish and non-Turkish Ottomanists will continue to mine these sources in
their research. Additional findings from other collections will no doubt balance
the Russian perspective presented in this article.
Russian commerce in the Ottoman Levant forms an integral part of the
Eastern Question rivalry that entangled European powers in a quest for profit and
leverage in the Ottoman Empire. Russian trade also belongs to Mediterranean
maritime history, a field of inquiry encompassing not just naval affairs and piracy
but the economic, commercial, social and cultural experience of those
communities affected, directly or indirectly, by the Mediterranean.30 The Straits
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not only intersect the Black Sea and the Aegean Archipelago but connect the
histories of the lands and peoples influenced by these bodies of water; the Straits
also feature prominently in the exchanges and disputes that characterized RussianOttoman relations. Ships and cargoes, mariners and merchandise, consular offices
and commercial treaties, ports and harbors, customs and quarantine facilities:
these topics in Russian-Ottoman maritime interactions continue to attract attention
from scholars worldwide who draw upon published and unpublished records. The
scrutiny and publication of these widely dispersed documents requires the
concerted cooperation of Russian, Ottoman and other specialists willing to share
their findings in a timely manner.
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